This paper analyzes how self-interest and long-term profit expectations provided the necessary incentives for the adult film industry to self-regulate and to find mechanisms to minimize the risks of HIV outbreaks that could result from the asymmetric information and network effects that characterize the industry. With the help of the Adult Industry Medical Healthcare Foundation (AIM), the adult film industry developed a corporate culture to facilitate widespread coordination among members and to make the industry similar to a private club. First, I discuss the predicted effects of asymmetric information and network-effect problems on the industry in terms of HIV outbreaks. Second, I tell the story of AIM and present the policies the industry has adopted since AIM's creation to mitigate those predicted effects. In particular, I discuss how the industry managed the 2004 HIV outbreak without government intervention. Finally, I present statistics comparing HIV infection rates in the industry and general population as well as additional observations to assess the relative effectiveness of the industry in preventing and containing HIV outbreaks.
Introduction
In April 2004, when an adult film performer tested positive for HIV and was subsequently found to have potentially infected other performers, public health officials, legislators and some members of the adult film industry saw this outbreak as a failure of the adult film industry to "prevent transmission of HIV and other STDs" (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005, 925) .
1 This outbreak underscored a clear need for the government to intervene and regulate. 
For example, in May 2004
Assemblyman Tim Leslie authored a bill (AB 2798) that "would require adult film performers to be screened for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases before they could be hired for a pornographic movie and would bar producers from hiring anyone who tested positive for disease" (Liu and Richardson 2004) . According to Leslie, the purpose of this new legislation was to prevent performers from "spreading diseases" outside the industry and "protect the public" (Liu and Richardson 2004) . Cal/OSHA, those companies "received citations for violating the state's blood borne pathogen standard, a regulation that requires employers to protect workers exposed to blood or bodily fluids on the job" (Malnic and Liu 2004) . More recently, Grudzen and Kerndt (2007, 0996) reiterated the need for "state and federal legislation to enforce health and safety standards for adult film performers." They also suggest that "legislation could require that the Custodian of Records (already required under federal law) maintain documentation of screening tests and condom usage in a film's production" (Grudzen and Kerndt 2007, 0996) .
Indeed, HIV outbreaks are a serious problem, and not only in the adult film industry. 4 HIV outbreaks occur first because infected individuals engage in unprotected sexual intercourse with other individuals who are members of the same group or network. Those individuals, in turn, engage in unprotected sexual intercourse, transmitting the disease to other group members.
Sometimes an infected member will engage in unprotected sexual intercourse with a member of a different group or network, thus communicating the disease to that network. HIV outbreaks can affect an entire network or multiple networks very quickly, depending of their size. Second, HIV outbreaks occur because infected individuals, while aware of their health status, do not communicate this information to their partners, or, as it is more often the case, because infected individuals are not aware of their health status. Third, HIV outbreaks occur because the commonly available HIV tests cannot detect the virus for weeks or even months after the initial infection. In other words, the main problem with HIV outbreaks is an information problem:
individuals lack information about their partner's HIV status. The HIV outbreak in the adult film industry in 2004 resulted from the problems mentioned above.
To economists, such problems are not novel. Market inefficiencies often result from information problems. In such situations, the function of government is to substitute for those market failures (Arrow 1963, 947) . More particularly, the literature on markets with asymmetric information, initiated by Akerlof (1970) , has also advanced arguments for government regulation.
One of these is that when some individuals are more informed than others, problems of trust arise because more informed individuals will tend to maximize their welfare at the expense of the less informed. Therefore, the literature often argues that government legislation and regulation are necessary to "protect" individuals who are less informed and thus attenuate those trust problems.
In addition to the asymmetric information literature, some economists have focused their attention on network externalities as another possible source of market failures. This literature focuses on optimal network size and argues that sometimes "networks may not reach optimal size, because users fail to take account of external benefits" conferred on the existing users of a product (Page and Lopatka 2000, 952) . In other words, the external benefits or network externalities resulting from each additional individual using the product "may cause markets to fail" (Page and Lopatka 2000, 952) .
Due to the nature of the HIV virus, the adult film industry fits the model of a market where information and network-effect problems are pervasive. Hence, it should not be a surprise that the 2004 HIV outbreak occurred. In absence of regulation, an industry plagued by such information and network-effect problems is bound to experience repeated outbreaks. As Brian K. O'Neel, spokesman for Tahoe City Republican Assemblyman Tim Leslie, suggested, the outbreak occurred because the adult film industry is the "only unregulated industry in California" (Romero 2004 ). However, while some economic models might support the public health officials, legislators, and other commentators making the case that the 2004 HIV outbreak shows that regulation of the adult film industry is necessary, two observations must be made.
First, while the literature does tend to favor government regulation of markets with asymmetric information, Arrow (1963, 967) points out in his article's Postscript that many social institutions have emerged to help overcome the problems associated with uncertainty. Similarly, as Akerlof (1970, 499-500) observes, "numerous institutions arise to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty." In recent years, a growing literature has investigated how market participants and industries have created private, market-based, institutional mechanisms to mitigate the problems of trust associated with asymmetric information. These studies show how "private institutions have frequently been more important than legal ones for establishing standards of behavior, ensuring contract compliance, and resolving disputes" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 267). 5 Similarly, the literature on network externalities does not consistently argue in favor of government regulation. For example, one solution is to internalize network externalities through ownership (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994, 137 This paper answers this question. It discusses how the adult film industry has successfully developed self-policing rules to establish standards of behavior that facilitate widespread coordination among industry participants and minimize the risks of HIV outbreaks. In implementing these policies, the adult film industry has made itself equivalent to a self-policing private club in which applicants need to "show white paw" before being allowed to join. At the core of this argument is the story of Adult Industry Medical Healthcare Foundation (AIM), which developed the self-policing rules. This paper shows how a combination of entrepreneurship, defined as a coordinating force of individual plans and decisions (Kirzner 1973, 219) and the development of a corporate culture, defined as a set of workable principles and routines that creates shared expectations for group members (Kreps 1996) , allowed the industry to mitigate the potentially fatal effects of the adverse selection and network-effect problems associated with HIV. As a result of these policies, HIV outbreaks are the exception and not the norm.
Section 2 examines the predicted effects that the asymmetric information and network effect problems associated with HIV have on the industry. Section 3 tells the story of Adult Industry
Medical Healthcare Foundation and its crucial role in developing the self-policing rules and facilitating widespread coordination to prevent and contain HIV outbreaks. Section 4 shows how these characteristics allowed the industry to manage the 2004 HIV crisis. Section 5 provides further evidence to illustrate the relative effectiveness of the industry in minimizing and containing outbreaks. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
The Adult Film Industry, Asymmetric Information, and Network Externalities

Asymmetric Information in the Adult Film Industry
The adult film industry fits perfectly into the model of a market with asymmetric information as described in the literature. 6 Moreover, the potential effects of asymmetric information in the adult industry could be deadly. First, adult performers are confronted with adverse selection in that that some are better informed about their own health than their partners and/or employers. Akerlof (1970) . 7 A moral hazard also exists to the extent that performers may engage in risky behaviors, such as intravenous drug use, unprotected male-to-male sexual contact, and unprotected anal sex, in their private lives. For example, the porn community attributed John Holmes's infection with HIV and subsequent death of AIDS to his drug use or bisexuality (Anthony, 2004) . See also McNeil and Osborne (2006, 448-451) . Similarly, John Stagliano (1999) , who tested positive for HIV in 1997, openly admitted that he caught HIV from a transsexual prostitute during Carnival in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, "during a particularly thought out evening of debauchery". See also McNeil and Osborne (2006, 586-587) . 8 While our focus is mostly on adverse selection, incomplete information is also a problem in that a performer might not know that he or she is infected.
upwards of twelve sex partners in a given month (Kernes 2003, 44) . It is easy to see how, in less than three weeks, the virus through partner-to-partner-to-partner could infect the entire industry. In addition to asymmetric information, the adult film industry faces another type of problem that potentially worsens the situation: network externalities. Page and Lopatka (2000, 7) explains that the existence of positive network externalities in adopting a particular course of action in a network implies that the private benefit of adopting such a course of action within the network is lower than the social benefit. The resulting "equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation," and network externalities cause market failure (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994, 135 In other words, Wallice did a cost-benefit analysis prior to his decision to falsify his test results, and the expected costs of remaining trustworthy appeared to exceed the benefits.
Similarly, one can reasonably hypothesize that individual performers rationally look at the individual costs and benefits associated with condom use and do not consider the joint or social benefits. Yim, Russo, and La Croix (1995, 107) show, in a more general framework, "that the rates at which individuals used condoms are positively associated with the expected benefits of such use" and that "such benefits vary with respect to epidemiological and economic variables" (Yim, Russo, and La Croix 1995, 107) . While studies show that condom use is the most effective way to reduce the risk of HIV transmission during sexual intercourse, and one can assume that individuals do not want to be infected with HIV, this is not the only variable that individuals take into account. Others may include "the rate at which condoms break, the rates of HIV seropositivity, rates of transmission of HIV via unprotected anal and vaginal intercourse, and the value of human life foregone due to HIV" (Yim, Russo, and La Croix 1995, 107) . As a result, Yim, Russo, and La Croix (1995, 113-117) find "striking variation in the expected benefits of using a condom across broad demographic groups (heterosexual versus homosexual) and across more narrowly defined demographic groups (black female heterosexuals versus white female heterosexuals)" explaining why individuals do not always choose to use a condom when engaging in sexual intercourse. More particularly, they find that, in some cases, the private benefits of condom use do not exceed its costs, even if the only cost is the price paid for the condom (Yim, Russo and La Croix 1995, 114) . In other words, the explanation of why condom use is not systematic in the general population is an economic one. Individuals calculate the costs and benefits associated with condom use. Sometimes, costs outweigh the benefits leading individuals to choose not to use a condom.
Applied to the adult film industry, one can hypothesize that performers adopt the same type of rational economic behavior. The benefits of condom use are often not large enough to give incentives to performers to use condoms, especially given the costs, including that requiring condom use can lead to a lower salary 12 or not working at all if the production company has a strict non-condom policy (Strauss 2008) . 13 Even if the fact that the per-contact HIV transmission rate for performers engaging in anal intercourse increases the benefits of condom use regardless of gender or ethnicity is accounted for, 14 those benefits are not guaranteed to exceed the costs associated with using condoms. While no documented data exist on which performers, male or female, require condom use, the documented seventeen percent condom use likely often involves female performers who have achieved a status within the industry such as they can afford to require that their partner use a condom. 15 In other words, the low rate of condom use in the adult industry can be explained by the fact that adult performers find that the expected private costs outweigh the benefits; social benefits and costs are not considered. Consequently, one can theoretically argue that condom use in the adult film industry is suboptimal and that this represents an example of market failure resulting from network externalities, which could lead to disastrous public health consequences. Indeed, public officials and other commentators repeatedly emphasized this in the wake of the 2004 HIV outbreak. However, the following 12 Lower salary for performing with condoms is often mentioned as an explanation of the low rate of condom use in the heterosexual side of the adult film industry. However, lower salaries cannot be dissociated from consumer preferences. Production companies often justify their choices of making no-condom movies on the basis that those movies generate more revenues indicating that consumers have a preference for no-condom movies. Consequently, if a performer requests a condom to be used, given the market conditions and the economic implications of such request, production companies will either offer a lower salary to the performer who asks to work with condoms or refuse to work with the performer. However, a lower salary is not the only factor explaining the low rate of condom use. Some actresses justify their preference not to use condoms based not on explicit monetary considerations but rather on "comfort" considerations. Due to the repetitive nature of the sexual interactions when filming a scene, some female performers insist that using condoms can cause pain, soreneass, or skin abrasions (Nina Hartley, interview by Maria Garza, "Dirty Business: Should the Porn Industry Be Saved?," Zócalo "Public Square" Lecture Series, Zócalo Radio, KPCC 89.3, Los Angeles, January 13, 2007). If condom use in the workplace can cause injuries that will prevent the performer from working for some period of time, thus leading to income loss, the performer will rationally elect not to use a condom. Such decision is not based on the income loss resulting from the production company paying her less for choosing to use a condom but rather on the expectation that using a condom can lead to income loss due to temporary incapacitation. 13 It is worth mentioning that Vivid Entertainment Group, one of the largest adult-entertainment companies with estimated annual revenues of $100 million, "has returned to a condom-optional policy where the female stars make the decision," justifying its decision on the fact that some female stars had refused to work with Vivid because of its condom-mandatory policy (Mark Kernes, "Analyzing The "Adult Film Industry" Report," Adult Video News, November 5, 2007, http://www.avn.com/performer/articles/472.html (accessed September 1, 2008)). 14 One should note that the per-contact HIV transmission rate is always higher in the case of receptive anal intercourse than insertive anal intercourse. See Yim, Russo, and La Croix, (1995, 111, Table 3 ) and references accompanying the text. However, studies have not measured the per-contact HIV-transmission rate for anal intercourse between heterosexual males and females. 15 Grudzen and Kerndt (2007, 0993) . In addition, some performers have chosen to use condoms at work but not in their personal relationships while others have made the opposite decision. Some female performers in committed relationships cease to work with male performers altogether and instead only work with other females. Such a decision also involves a willingness to accept less pay. See, for example, Acme Andersson (2003, 74 The PCR-DNA test is composed of an inhibitory substance, which means it's a replicate of the virus; that's all it means, is that they're making a "puzzle piece," and if there's HIV in the blood, it will react with the inhibitory substance, and if there is a fit, if the "puzzle" fits by polymerase chain reaction, which is an amplification test, then indeed the inhibitory substance is found, and it says, "ALERT: This is a fit for the replicate of the inhibitory substance for the HIV virus." So, when that's alerted, then we have the copy of the virus itself, so we're testing directly for the inhibitory substance of the virus. So, in other words, we're testing for the disease itself rather than the viral load or the antibody. If someone is found to be positive by PCR-DNA, we do an ELISA test, which sometimes they're positive and sometimes they're negative. We test them for RNA, because we want to notify partners, and if we find that their viral load is very high, we can determine how far or how not-sofar to go back in terms of partner notification, and of course, the Western Blot, which is very important because when you're dealing with PCR-DNA, your Western Blot test is going to come up positive on one or two bands; in others, it shows which of the antigens are coming up first.
That's just a more definitive way of measuring the proteins in the antibody. It's going to tell me whether it's an early or an old infection by how many bands are positive.
Establishing the PCR-DNA test as the standard HIV test in the adult industry permits earlier detection of HIV cases, thus reducing the number of potential partners that the patient zero may infect, which facilitates tracking those partners. This is a clear improvement over the ELISA test.
Along with introducing the PCR-DNA test as the industry standard, Mitchell clearly contributed to making monthly testing a standard as well. Before 1998, testing was not very systematic, with performers getting tested every three months. When producer and director John
Stagliano and performer Nena Cherry tested positive for HIV in early 1997, producers and directors began requiring performers to get tested every month, but that was inadequate because of the window period of the ELISA test. And, although performers were supposed to be tested monthly, there were "dozens of people going to dozens of different clinics, with no monitoring at all" (Kernes 2003, 46 [Insert Table 1] AIM also conducts monthly prevention education meetings for performers, producers, and directors "who want to know more about HIV and STD transmission." (Farrar 2004 
The 2004 HIV Outbreak
Containing the Outbreak
The news that a forty-year-old who had been performing in adult movies since 1998, Darren James, had tested positive for HIV, officially broke on April 13, 2004. The announcement came after James took a confirmatory Western blot test following two positive PCR-DNA HIV tests on April 9. He had tested negative three weeks earlier, on March 17, upon his return from Brazil.
While out of the country he had performed in a movie in which he engaged in unprotected, considered risky, penetration (Kerndt 2008, 22-23) . 23 Because he reported to AIM that he experienced flu-like symptoms upon his return from Brazil that self-resolved, which often occur with acute HIV infection, it seemed highly likely that James had been infected in Brazil.
24
Because James tested negative on March 17 and, therefore, was cleared to work, a race against time started. Given how fast HIV could travel between partners, it became imperative for AIM to create a quarantine as fast as possible.
AIM's first step was to identify the performers with whom James worked between March 17
and April 9, place them on voluntary quarantine, and test them at least twice to avoid possible false-positive test results. Fortunately, as soon as James' positive test became official, the three companies for which he had worked released the names of his on-screen partners. Within thirtysix hours, AIM had compiled a list of the first generation of performers, the ones who had direct sexual contact with James. AIM needed only an additional twelve hours to compile the second generation, those who had direct sexual contact with a first-generation performer (Sanders 2005) .
As AIM documented (see Figure 1) , thirteen female workers and one male worker had direct sexual contact with James, while the second generation included thirty-three performers. AIM managed the situation methodically and systematically. First, it checked its database for the date of the last test of first-generation performers and the date they worked with James. 25 Second, those workers were called "for emergency protocol testing" through PCR-DNA; they were "tested again at the thirty-day mark." The results of their second test were posted on the AIM website. AIM placed second-generation talents on voluntary quarantine, requesting that they not work until the first-generation talent(s) they had worked with were cleared from the quarantine. If a first-generation performer they worked with tested positive, the second-generation performers had to go through the same procedure of immediate testing and then retesting after thirty days.
Unfortunately The quarantine list was officially maintained until June 30. Except for the performers infected by Darren James, all quarantined performers were cleared.
The Moratorium
At the same time that AIM was tracking the performers who had worked with Darren James, a "historical" event took place that shows a self-regulating industry attempting to mitigate the adverse selection problems and network effects associated with the HIV virus: adult film companies stopped production.
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As soon as it was officially announced that James had worked with thirteen women, AIM and many members of the adult film industry knew that the virus had very likely spread, but not how far. As discussed above, a STD could theoretically reach about one hundred ninety-eight workers in three days. It appeared that "a third and even a fourth-generation" already could be "in the outbreak." However, AIM could not quarantine the third and fourth generation, given that it was technically impossible for them to "track that many people fast enough" ( 
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In addition, the adult film industry provided some incentives for performers to respect both the quarantine and the moratorium, and to discourage them from entering the underground market. For instance, in April 2004 performer Jenna Jameson created the Adult Industry Assistance Fund (AIAF) to financially help performers affected by the moratorium. Another company, Juicy Entertainment, prepaid people who were scheduled to work on productions to be 26 The history of the adult film industry includes no such event prior to 2004. 27 While there is no data available on the respective size of those production companies except for Vivid, Wicked Videos, Private USA, and Hustler Video that are regularly featured in the medias, the other companies listed as declaring a moratorium on production are occasionally mentioned in the media and, therefore, suggest that their size is not insignificant.
shot when the moratorium was lifted (Ross, Adult Industry Offers Help for Those Affected by the
Moratorium 2004).
Originally, the moratorium was supposed to last sixty days, until every first and secondgeneration performer should have been cleared from the quarantine list. However, the moratorium was officially lifted on May 11, thirty days after it was self-imposed, as most quarantined performers were cleared after testing negative three times in forty-five days using several testing methods ( From an economic viewpoint, performers cooperated because it was in their best interest. Not cooperating could have led to more significant costs than those associated with the loss of income during the moratorium or while under quarantine. As stated above, in their decisions to perform in the adult industry, performers likely take into account not only the risks associated with some sex acts but also the costs associated with being infected with HIV or another STD. Those costs include treatment fees but also the loss of income associated with being out of work during the treatment period.
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Similarly, one could also interpret the decision of production companies to cooperate and to attempt to coordinate their actions to contain the HIV outbreak as an economic one. Given that the pool of applicants is virtually unlimited, production companies can have little regard for the health of their performers; what matters is that those performers bring revenues to the companies.
However, those companies, in agreeing to adopt the self-regulating policies described above, do protect the health of their performers, particularly their contract performers, because they bring revenues to those companies. From a strict economic viewpoint, long-run expected profits associated with keeping a company's performers healthy largely exceed the costs associated with shutting down production for two months. Therefore, it was in production companies' best interest to attempt to control the spread of the disease. are not null, as they would be in the absence of asymmetric information and network effects, would be "a thoroughly bad, pernicious, and harmful approach" to the problem (Coase 1964, 194-195) . To quote Ronald Coase (1964, 195) , "until we realize that we are choosing between social arrangements, which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway." In other words, a comparative institutional analysis is the only appropriate method to derive economic policy conclusions. Therefore, at this point of the study, it is relevant to initiate such an analysis through a few observations and questions.
First, a comparison of HIV infection in the industry and within the general population can help provide a better assessment of the adult film industry's overall performance in minimizing the risks of HIV transmission. Hall et al. (2008, 520) provides "the first direct estimates of HIV incidence in the United States using laboratory technologies previously implemented only in clinical-based settings." This study shows that previous research significantly underestimated the number of annual new infections. Hall, et al. (2008, 524, population (with a 95 percent confidence interval). More importantly, the study shows that 33 percent of new HIV infections (13,100) occurred through heterosexual intercourse (Hall, et al. 2008, 522, (Hall, et al. 2008, 522, Finally, one must raise another question: how will the alternative condom-only mandate work in practice? Ira Levine (2007, 40:15-41:50) describes the dilemma perfectly:
The issue here really in terms of making it mandatory is a classic example of competing goods.
There are two things we would like to see happen. We would like to see everybody use condoms.
So if they were mandatory it will be a good thing, but the only way to enforce that would be to make everybody who works as a performer into an employee and subject to the State jurisdiction transmission, the probability of a HIV outbreak in the adult film industry under governmentenforced condom-only legislation is not zero either.
Without the ability to legally maintain a database of test results in conjunction with other performer-related information, generating a quarantine list to contain an HIV outbreak will not be legally possible (at least under California's current HIV/AIDS laws). Consequently, it is difficult 37 In the adult film industry, except for a few performers who are under exclusive contract with a production company and, therefore, have employee status, adult film industry performers are independent contractors. It is because of this status that the adult film industry can legally require performers to be tested as a condition of their "employment" as well as ask them to sign a release form to allow AIM to release their test results to the companies, directors, and performers they work with. Health and Safety Code Section 120980 does not cover independent contractors. As for the contract performers, production companies pay for their tests and therefore, technically, do not require their performers to get tested; they just pay for their tests. 38 See Davis and Weller (1999) who find that "the condom's effectiveness at preventing HIV transmission is estimated to be at 87, with a range varying from as low as 60% to as high as 96% depending upon the incidence among condom nonusers." See also Pinkerton and Ambramson (1997) who develop a meta-analysis showing that condoms are 90 to 95 percent effective in preventing HIV transmission when used consistently. 39 See, for example, Trussell, Warner and Hatcher (1992) who estimate condom breakage or slippage during intercourse at 7.9%. See also Lindberg, Sonenstein, Ku and Levin (1997) who estimate condom breakage rates at 2.5 percent but also shows that increased experience with condoms reduces the likelihood of experiencing condom breakage. Sex education is also associated with a 80 percent decrease in the risk of breakage among young men who use condoms infrequently. See also Thomas Yim, Russo and La Croix (1995, 109 and references accompanying Table 1) .
to see how, in such a legal environment, an HIV outbreak would have less damaging consequences for adult film industry performers as well as the general public.
Concluding Remarks
This analysis has several implications. First, the adult film industry provides a natural experiment in self-regulation and emergent rules facilitating widespread coordination between group members as opposed to systemic breakdowns. The adult film industry succeeded in developing self-policing rules to establish standards of behavior among industry participants, thus allowing the industry to successfully minimize and contain HIV outbreaks. As a result of this, HIV outbreaks are the exception and not the norm. Returning to Coase (1964) , in terms of economic policy implications, the choice is not between first best (no outbreak) and second best (pervasive outbreaks) options, but between second best options (more or fewer outbreaks). This implication leads to a second one.
Condoms are highly effective in preventing HIV and other STDs. Therefore, there is little doubt that a voluntarily adopted condom-only policy in conjunction with the industry's current mandatory testing policies would constitute a better option. However, this does not imply that government-enforced condom-only legislation imposed on the industry would be an equally better option. A study of the unintended and possibly counterproductive public health consequences that such legislation might bring about is needed. As many insiders have observed, not only would mandating condom use mean abandoning the current industry-enforced mandatory testing policies because HIV testing as a condition of employment is illegal under current California's HIV/AIDS laws, but it would also likely drive the industry underground or abroad. One cannot ignore that such legislation would negatively impact production companies' revenues if consumers prefer no-condom movies. If the costs of the legislation become prohibitive for production companies, they will likely attempt to move abroad to avoid the legislation or go underground. Then, the self-regulating policies that have been successful in recent years will be much more costly to maintain and thus less likely to be enforced, leading to an increase in HIV outbreaks, as many policymakers dread. In addition to these potential unintended consequences, other questions remain to be answered. For example, how would such legislation be applied and enforced when adult film companies produce movies on foreign sets or work with non-resident foreign actors? Moreover, the costs of implementing and enforcing such legislation must be accounted for. 
